TheFirst Part of the Query
This is how the question was raised:
Specifically, I am trying to find concrete evidence that the following claims of many web sites are incorrect:
- There is no law requiring individals to pay income tax.My Reply
- The 16th amendment applies only to those in a federal jurisdiction, defined as DC, corporations and entities which deal in things like tobacco.
- "Income", according to court cases, is defined as "capital gain" as opposed to "compensation" in exchange for labor.
Here is an example:
* * * * * * * *
Plaintiff claims on appeal that he is not a taxpayer subject to IRS
jurisdiction, and the withholding of income tax from his wages
violated fifth amendment due process, the supremacy clause, the
prohibition against bills of attainder, 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 and
1986, 18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242, and 5 U.S.C. §§555 and 556. He also
claims that the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable and the award of
defendants' attorneys' fees was erroneous. The district court
correctly held that plaintiff's claims were without merit. Plaintiff's
claim that he is not a taxpayer is unsupported and frivolous. See
Martin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 756 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.
1985). Wages are taxable income. Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 746 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1984). It is well-settled that
withholding income tax from wages does not violate the constiution.
See Edgar v. Inland Steel Co., 744 F.2d 1276 (7th Cir. 1984);
Robinson v. A & M Electric, Inc., 713 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1983);
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1145 (1982). An allegation that the taxpayer's employer withheld
taxes from the taxpayer's wages does not state a cause of action
against either the IRS or the employer. Id. Plaintiff has also failed
to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which requires violation of
civil rights under color of state law. See Edgar v. Inland Steel Co.,
supra; Stonecipher v. Bray, supra. His claims under sections 1985 and
1986 are without merit because allegations of racial or other class
based discrimination are required to state a claim under these
sections. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971);
Stonecipher v. Bray, supra. Plaintiff's claim that the IRS has
discriminated against the "class" of nontaxpayers is ludicrous.
18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242, criminal counterparts to the civil rights
statutes, do not provide a basis for civil liability. Aldabe v.
Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff's claims under
5 U.S.C. §§555 and 556 are clearly frivolous.
While we did not award damages in Hatfield we issued this warning--
"* * * but if tax protesters continue to bring such frivolous cases,
serious consideration should be given to imposing such damages".
[Citations omitted.] Similar warnings were promulgated in Crowder v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978- 273 and Clippinger v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1978-107. Tax protest petitions continued to be filed with
this Court with increased frequency and, finally, upon motion of
respondent, we began awarding damages to the United States in
appropriate cases. See Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633 (1979)
and Greenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 806 (1980)
.n18 Shortly after
we issued Greenberg we, for the first time, awarded damages in a
proper circumstance on our own motion. Syndes v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 864, 870-873 (1980), affd. 647 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1981)
.n19
Petitions filed merely for delay continued to overburden this
Court's docket. In recognition of this fact, on June 15, 1981, we
aptly stated--
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has, in a summary and
decisive manner, awarded double costs (under Rule 38, Fed. R. App.
P.) in several tax protester cases on its own motion. On July 7,
1982, in Edwards v. Commissioner, supra at 1271, the Court said--
Here, petitioner has instituted these proceedings and has asserted
as his defense to the Commissioner's determinations nothing but
frivolous contentions. Petitioners with genuine controversies have
been delayed while we considered this case. In these circumstances,
petitioner cannot and has not shown that he, in good faith, has a
colorable claim to challenge the Commissioner's determinations.
Indeed, he knew when he filed his petition that he had no reasonable
expectation of receiving a favorable decision. There has been no
change in the legal climate and in view of the extensive and long
well settled case precedents, no reasonably prudent person could have
expected this Court to reverse itself in this situation
.n22
"When the costs incurred by this Court and respondent are taken
into consideration, the maximum damages authorized by the statute
($500) do not begin to indemnify the United States for the expenses
which petitioner's frivolous action has occasioned. Considering the
waste of limited judicial and administrative resources caused by
petitioner's action, even the maximumdamages authorized by Congress
are wholly inadequate to compensate the United States and its other
taxpayers. These costs must eventually be borne by all of the
citizens who honestly and fairly participate in our tax collection
system. * * *". Sydnes v. Commissioner, supra at 872-873.
Since we conclude that this case was brought merely for delay, the
maximum damages authorized by law ($500) are appropriate and will be
awarded pursuant to section 6673. To reflect the foregoing
An appropriate order and decision will be entered.
The Next Comment by the Inquiring Person
[URLs omitted because I do not want to bring attention to
these sites]
These pages (in particular [omitted]) site various court cases,
explanations of the Constitution and such, that make a very convincing
argument.
My Response
Gordeon W. Beerbower v. U.S., Commissioner of Internal Revenue
et al., 787 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1986)
In fact, the courts now impose penalties for delay for those raising
these arguments. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1983-476.
Here is an extract from that case:
The final matter we consider is whether, in the circumstances here
extant, we should, on our own motion, award damages to the United
States under section 6673 n16 and, if so, in what amount. We
addressed the very heart of this matter in September of 1977 in
Hatfield v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 895, 899 (1977), when we stated in
clear and unequivocal language:
In fact, many of these people have been sentenced to prison for
failure to comply. So those taking the advice you cite are incurring
a big risk. Those giving such advice, once others act thereon, are
taking even a bigger risk because they often are targeted for
criminal prosecution.
In recent times, this Court has been faced with numerous cases,
such as this one, which have been commenced without any legal
justification but solely for the purpose of protesting the Federal tax
laws. This Court has before it a large number of cases which deserve
careful consideration as speedily as possible, and cases of this sort
needlessly disrupt our consideration of those genuine controversies.
Moreover, by filing cases of this type, the protesters add to the
caseload of the Court, which has reached a record size, and such
cases increase the expenses of conducting this Court and the
operations of the IRS, which expenses must eventually be borne by all
of us.
Many citizens may dislike paying their fair share of taxes;
everyone feels that he or she needs the money more than the
Government. On the other hand, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes so
eloquently stated: "Taxes are what we pay for civilized society".
Compania de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927). The
greatness of our nation is in no small part due to the willingness
of our citizens to honestly and fairly participate in our tax
collection system which depends upon self-assessment. Any citizen
may resort to the courts whenever he or she in good faith and with a
colorable claim desires to challenge the Commissioner's
determination; but that does not mean that a citizen may resort to
the courts merely to vent his or her anger and attempt symbolically
to throw a wrench at the system. Access to the courts depends upon a
real and actual wrong--not an imagined wrong--which is susceptible of
judicial resolution. General grievances against the policies of the
Government, or against the tax system as a whole, are not the types
of controversies to be resolved in the courts; Congress is the
appropriate body to which such matters should be referred.
n17
It may be appropriate to note further that this Court has been
flooded with a large number of so-called tax protester cases in which
thoroughly meritless issues have been raised in, at best, misguided
reliance upon lofty principles. Such cases tend to disrupt the
orderly conduct of serious litigation in this Court, and the issues
raised therein are of the type that have been consistently decided
against such protesters and their contentions often characterized as
frivolous. The time has arrived when the Court should deal summarily
and decisively with such cases without engaging in scholarly
discussion of the issues or attempting to soothe the feelings of the
petitioners by referring to the supposed "sincerity" of their wildly
espoused positions. [McCoy v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1027, 1029-1030
(1981), affd. 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983).Emphasis added.]
This Court is not the only Court that has considered awarding
damages or other costs, either on its own motion or on motion of the
Commissioner, in a proper case. In a tax protester situation, where
one of the frivolous issues was whether the U.S. Constitution forbids
taxation of compensation received for personal services, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in late 1981--
Appellants' contentions are stale ones, long settled against them.
As such they are frivolous. Bending over backwards, in indulgence
of appellants' pro se status, we today forbear the sanctions of Rule
38, Fed. R. App. P. We publish this opinion as notice to future
litigants that the continued advancing of these long-defunct
arguments invites such sanctions, however. [Lonsdale v. Commissioner,
661 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981), affg. T.C. Memo. 1981-122.
]n20
In Knighten v. Commissioner, supra, the Court of Appeals following
its warning took action. There, damages were not sought nor awarded
in our Court. Damages were sought by the Commissioner and double
costs were awarded in the Court of Appeals.
Meritless appeals of this nature are becoming increasingly
burdensome on the federal court system. We find this appeal
frivolous, Fed. R. App. P. 38, and accordingly award double costs to
appellee [the Commissioner of Internal Revenue]. [Citations
omitted.] [Emphasis added.] Accord, McCoy v. Commissioner, supra;
Barmakian v. Commissioner, 698 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1982), affg.
without published opinion an unreported order and decision of this
Court; Martindale v. Commissioner, supra
.n21
The following are sites which discuss this position:
Sounding convincing and being correct are two different things.
Additional information can be found at
Daniel B. Evans' THE TAX PROTESTOR FAQ Site.
"Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that proceedings before it have been instituted by the taxpayer merely for delay, damages in an amount not in excess of $500 shall be awarded to the United States by the Tax Court in its decision. Damages so awarded shall be assessed at the same time as the deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary and shall be collected as a part of the tax".We observe that in proceedings commenced after December 31, 1982 this Court is permitted to impose damages up to $5,000 where those proceedings have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or where taxpayer's position in such proceeding is frivolous or groundless. See secs. 292(b) and (e)(2), Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97- 248, 96 Stat. 574. [Back to text]
17. The language in the first paragraph quoted above, so true when stated, is all the more impelling today because of the ever increasing caseload of this Court. [Back to text]
18. See also, Goodrich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-414; Cornell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-370; Stamper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-248; Sommer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-196, on appeal (7th Cir. July 12, 1983); Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-198; Senesi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981- 723, affd. ___ F.2d ___ (6th Cir. 1983); Swann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-236, dismissed (9th Cir. 1981). We note that the predecessor of the statute we now consider, which in essence, contained virtually identical language, was enacted by Congress in 1926. [Back to text]
19. See also Vickers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-429; Mele v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-387; Ballard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-56; and Graves v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-154, affd. without published opinion 698 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1982), where damages were awarded on our own motion. [Back to text]
20. Rule 38, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides--
DAMAGES FOR DELAY. If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to appellee. [Back to text]
21. In none of the four cases decided by the Ninth Circuit were damages sought or awarded in this Court. [Back to text]
22. "* * * [A] person's intent in performing an act includes not only his motive for acting (which may be defined as the objective which inspires the act), but also extends to include the consequences which he believes or has reason to believe are substantially certain to follow." Greenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 806, 814 (1980). [Back to text]